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I. Introduction 
The idea that competition among institutional systems (also known as regulatory or juris-
dictional competition: from now on JC) is an effective mechanism to select or deselect laws, 
rules and policies has a long pedigree in the disciplines of public finance, public choice, law 
and economics, and is a tenet of theories of fiscal federalism and constitutional econom-
ics.1 Through the influence of Hayek,2 JC has also influenced neo- and ordo-liberalism. Ac-
cording to one of its earliest and still much quoted formulation, that of Charles Tiebout,3 JC 
is about attracting and retaining scarce and valuable economic resources on the side of 
governments (typical sub-national units within a federation) in a context which allows the 
consumers or users of jurisdictional services (i.e. corporations, individuals, workers etc.) to 
freely switch their resources to alternative jurisdictions. Under conditions of imperfect in-
formation, the matching between consumers and jurisdictions cannot generate a sponta-
neous equilibrium, but rather an incessant variety of regulatory and policy solutions and 
cross-system movements, promoting efficiency and diversity.  
With increasing globalization and the deepening of European integration, the JC debate 
has acquired a new momentum.4 The EU in particular can be seen as a historically unprec-
edented laboratory to gauge the alleged virtues of this type of competition (at the level of 
States, not just sub-national governments), to identify the meta-rules which can sustain or 
hamper such virtues and, last but not least, to derive prescriptions for improvement.5 
Not everybody shares, however, the favor with which law and economics approaches 
look at JC. The most widespread critique is that the latter may well generate efficiency 
gains and economic advantages through policy selection, but is also likely to cause an 
overall race to the bottom among systems,6 especially as regards social standards, with 
detrimental effects for the most vulnerable.7 While certainly plausible and empirically 
grounded, such critique still accepts the premises of JC theory: what is contested are the 
 
1 W. OATES, Fiscal and Regulatory Competition: Theory and Evidence, in Perspektiven der 
Wirtschaftspolitik, 2003, p. 377 et seq. 
2 F. VON HAYEK, The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism, in F. VON HAYEK (ed.), Individualism 
and Economic Order, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, p. 131 et seq. 
3 C.M. TIEBOUT, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, in The Journal of Political Economy, 1956, p. 416 et seq. 
4 P. BERNHOLZ , R. VAUBEL (eds), Political Competition and Economic Regulation, London: Routledge, 2007. 
5 D. ESTY, D. GERADIN (eds), Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration: Comparative Perspec-
tives, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; V. VANBERG, Globalization, Democracy and Citizen Sovereignty. 
Can Competition Among Governments Enhance Democracy?, in Constitutional Political Economy, 2000, p. 
87 et seq.; V. VANBERG, Competition Among Governments: The State's Two Roles in a Globalized World, 
Freiburg: Walter Eucken Institut e.V., 2010, www.econstor.eu; for a critical view see M. HÖPNER, A. SCHÄFER, 
Embeddedness and Regional Integration: Waiting for Polanyi in a Hayekian Setting, in International Organ-
ization, 2012, p. 429 et seq. 
6 H.W. SINN, The Selection Principle and Market Failure in System Competition, in Journal of Public 
Economics, 1997, p. 85 et seq. 
7 P. GENSCHEL, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Welfare State, in Politics & Society, 2002, p. 245 
et seq. 
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consequences of JC, not its analytical assumptions about political competition – and dem-
ocratic politics more generally. 
Competition does play a significant role in contemporary political science. Rather 
than focusing on citizens and their need to shop around governmental jurisdictions in 
order to satisfy their preferences, empirical democratic theories tend however to focus 
on governmental authorities (or would be such) and their propensity to compete for citi-
zen votes. Even though the rational calculus plays a role in vote choices, an equally sig-
nificant role is played by ideological orientations, partisan identifications, habitual and 
emotional factors, and other non-rational elements. Elections are in their turn always 
embedded in a larger framework of “diffuse support” for the democratic polity as such, 
i.e. as community of citizens and groups sharing a political identity and thus a deep – and 
often implicit– attachment to the community and its authority structures (“right or wrong, 
my country”). Logically and empirically, the baseline of any reasoning about JC should 
thus be a set of relatively closed democratic associations/communities which democrat-
ically decide to open up to each other through the dismantlement of boundaries, accept 
the principles of free movement and nondiscrimination and create the conditions for JC. 
Most emblematically, this has been the experience of the European Union. The logical 
and empirical priority of shared political identities and democratic competition over JC 
has significant implications, especially as regards the transition process leading from 
democratic closure with no institutional competition among systems to democratic open-
ing with full institutional competition.  
Fiscal federalism, constitutional economics and ordoliberal ideas have provided many 
ideational insights for shaping the EU institutional architecture, especially that of the Euro-
pean Monetary Union (EMU). But the expected virtuous effects of these theories are now 
hugely at odds with recent developments. During the last decade the issues of open bound-
aries, the free movement of persons, workers, capitals and services have become increas-
ingly contentious. How can we account for such developments? They have resulted – I con-
tend – from a mechanism linked with “opening” which is entirely neglected by law and eco-
nomics approaches: boundary removal promotes exit, but is inherently exposed to the risk 
of provoking a political countermovement and/or eroding the diffuse support for jurisdic-
tional authorities. In his masterful book, The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi argued that 
during the 19th century the utopia of a self-regulating market caused a social counter-move-
ment, whose ultimate offspring was the welfare State.8 It can be suggested that the 20th 
century has closed with a powerful strike back of the same utopia, extended, this time 
round, from economic to institutional competition. Also this second great transformation 
has produced a countermovement, of an essentially political nature. The rise of sou-
verainisme can be in fact interpreted as a defensive reaction of nation-states against the 
erosion/dispersion of their authority. Politics cannot be reduced to a rational selection of 
 
8 K. POLANYI, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston: Bea-
con Press, 1957. 
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public policies in response to regime shopping. It is a much wider and delicate sphere 
whose fundamental task is that of keeping the polity together through democratic author-
itative decisions. It is a difficult task which requires much more than just smart economic 
constitutions and whose failure may have tragic consequences. 
Starting from these premises, in this Article I intend to highlight some features of 
democratic politics which are neglected by JC theory and weaken its explanatory and pre-
scriptive effectiveness. I will try to argue my points by using the well-known categories of 
“exit”, “voice” and “loyalty” first introduced and systematically linked with each other by 
Albert Hirschman.9 JC theories explicitly build on the mechanism of “exit” as a reaction to 
quality deterioration on the side of consumers/citizens and thus as a prompt for quality 
recuperation on the side of producers/jurisdictional leaders. JC theories also make use of 
the notion of “loyalty” and occasionally mention voice as well. In their turn, democratic 
theories have heavily drawn on Hirschman’s concepts and insights to investigate both the 
historical process of State-building and, more recently, the process of European integra-
tion and EU-building. Hirschman’s model lends itself well, in other words, to open a hope-
fully constructive dialogue between democratic theorists and JC scholars, raising the lat-
ter’s awareness of some neglected aspects of the democratic political process.  
The Article is divided into four sections. The first summarizes some key tenets of JC 
theories and discusses in particular the role which the latter assigns to exit. The second 
section illustrates the logic of democratic competition within spatially bounded territorial 
communities and highlights the role of voice and loyalty, which JC theories tend to down-
play or neglect. The third section focuses on the current EU political predicament and 
interprets it as the outcome of the destructuring side-effects of increased exit opportu-
nities. The last section concludes. 
II. Jurisdictional competition and the virtues of exit 
JC theory is the offspring of different schools of thought. As mentioned, its origins date 
back to Tiebout’s model, according to which the best match between citizens’ preferences 
and government public policies can be achieved through a “market” of competing legal 
jurisdictions offering tax-benefit packages to a customer base of mobile taxpaying citi-
zens. Rational individuals will survey the range of available choices and will act in accord-
ance with their preferences for specific bundles of public goods (and levels of taxation) 
offered by location-specific jurisdictions. In line with such reasoning, Tiebout was a strong 
supporter of administrative and fiscal devolution. The Tiebout model has had a profound 
influence on public economics and public choice theory. According to the "Leviathan" 
 
9 A.O. HIRSCHMAN, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970. 
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theory of the tax-welfare State proposed by Buchanan,10 governments use their monop-
olistic positions to pursue revenue maximization, while powerful interest groups capture 
the benefits of public spending programs. Since traditional political controls fail to con-
tain government growth, decentralization – backed by a strong economic constitution – 
proves intrinsically beneficial because it reduces the scope of the central government 
monopoly and contains the negative effects of regulatory capture. JC has exerted a sig-
nificant influence also on the interdisciplinary field of law and economics.11 Legal scholars 
have extended the focus of JC theory from the production of goods and services to all 
outputs of legal regulation, from contract enforcement to social and labor law. In this 
perspective, governments are just another type of producers in the overall economy and 
law is their product. In recent decades, JC has become a tenet of legal and fiscal theories 
of federalism and has attracted the attention of some ordo-liberal scholars of the Frei-
burg school.12 These scholars (and in particular Viktor Vanberg) have offered novel elab-
orations of JC theory, discussing in more depths its political underpinnings and applying 
it to the process of European integration.  
In line with Tiebout, contemporary JC looks at States as enterprises providing packages 
of jurisdiction services and regulations the for inhabitants and users of their territories.13 
States have, however, a second function: like cooperatives or member-owned organiza-
tions, they “should serve the common interests of their members, the citizens”.14 Citizen 
sovereignty must be safeguarded by rules that encourage the “producers of politics” to re-
spond to citizens wants. In line with Hayekian theory and the principles of fiscal federalism, 
the most appropriate institutional architecture is a system of split-level governance, involv-
ing the sharing of legal powers between a central or federal authority and lower-level 
States, regions or localities. The main function of the central authority is to ensure free 
movement across jurisdictions, which requires legislative and judicial action to remove bar-
riers to circulation and eliminate distortions of competition. The worst evil to be guarded 
off is “rent-seeking”, i.e. the acquisition of selective privileges or regulatory capture by spe-
cial interest groups. This worry was central in the doctrine of first generation Ordo-liber-
als.15 Public choice theorists have traditionally argued that rent seeking must be contrasted 
 
10 J.M. BUCHANAN, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1975. 
11 T.F. COTTER, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Movement, in Georgetown Law Journal, 
1996, p. 2071 et seq.; V. VANBERG, Freiburg School of Law and Economics, in P. NEWMAN (ed.), The New Pal-
grave Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 2, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998, p. 172 et seq. 
12 A. PEACOCK, H. WILLGERODT (eds), German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy, Vol. 1, Lon-
don: Macmillan for the Trade Policy Research Centre, 1989. 
13 V. VANBERG, Globalization, Democracy and Citizen Sovereignty, cit.; V. VANBERG, Competition Among 
Governments, cit.; V. VANBERG, Competitive Federalism, Government’s’ Dual Role and the Power to Tax, in 
Journal of Institutional Economics, 2016, p. 825 et seq.  
14 V. VANBERG, Globalization, Democracy and Citizen Sovereignty, cit., p. 89. 
15 J. HIEN, C. JOERGES, Ordoliberalism, Law and the Rule of Economics, London: Hart, 2017. 
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by an economic constitution16 that equips governments with adequate tools to implement 
schemes which benefit all citizens (the enabling part of the constitution) but also prevents 
them from acting in the interest of some special groups or against the interests of all (the 
limiting part of the constitution). In the recent Freiburg re-formulation, the economic con-
stitution is not enough: the best remedy is a combination of the latter with JC.17 JC also 
enhances the capacity for learning based on diversity and for solving that “knowledge prob-
lem” which had been highlighted by Hayek. Since knowledge is dispersed, it is inherently 
difficult to establish where the common interest lies and how best to achieve it. JC operates 
not only as a motivational force, but also as a vehicle of discovery, a way to improve 
knowledge and understanding about efficient performance. 
JC brings into light the “protectionist dilemma” of democratic polities and at the same 
time provides a solution. Intra-jurisdictional special interests will tend to lobby in order 
to capture protectionist advantages. Since no actor can be sure that other actors will re-
frain from such behaviors, everybody has an incentive to adopt them, generating a typical 
prisoner dilemma. The economic constitution can pose constraints on government au-
thorities in order to contain this dilemma. But in the Freiburg reformulation, constitu-
tional provisions have only limited disciplinary powers.18 The most effective counterforce 
against rent-seeking protectionism is, precisely, JC. It is true that inter-jurisdictional com-
petitive relations can themselves degenerate into collectively harmful “beggar-thy-neigh-
bor” confrontations (e.g. exploiting the possibilities provided by a context of unbridled 
tax competition). But such potential degenerations can be contained through appropri-
ate meta-constitutional provisions valid for the entire association of those associations 
engaged in JC (e.g. the EU). Such rules must see to it that all participants derive more 
benefits than costs from intra and inter-state competition and thus consider the system 
as legitimate, based on its efficient performance.  
The proponents of JC are aware that a given democratic polity may choose to insulate 
certain cherished characteristics of their system from competition; that particular polities 
may also want to ensure some degree of redistribution among its citizens, opposing po-
tential “races to the bottoms”, e.g. as regards social standards.19 Thee proponents of JC 
argue, however, that these preferences remain fully compatible with their model, as they 
can be secured through appropriate institutional designs. This case is made especially in 
respect of the European Union – an association of associations (the Member States) 
whose economic constitution (the Treaties) is based, precisely, on free movement and 
undistorted competition. As long as the participant units want to preserve their welfare 
 
16 J.M. BUCHANAN, The Domain of Constitutional Economics, in Constitutional Political Economy, 1990, 
p. 1 et seq.; D.J. GERBER, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law and 
the "New" Europe, in The American Journal of Comparative Law, 1994, p. 25 et seq. 
17 V. VANBERG, Globalization, Democracy and Citizen Sovereignty, cit. 
18 Ibidem and V. VANBERG, Competition Among Governments, cit. 
19 H.W. SINN, The Selection Principle and Market Failure in System Competition, cit. 
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State distinctiveness, then harmful tax competition must be prevented, lest some gov-
ernments avail of the latter to generate jurisdictional rents.20 
JC theory is based on a close analogy between citizenship and consumership. It looks 
at laws and institutions as responses to the preferences of citizens, who can “vote with their 
feet” by moving to more convenient jurisdictions in the wake of cost-benefit calculations. 
Competition pressures legislators into being sensitive to exits as signals of dissatisfaction 
and to potential entries as signal of attractiveness. It is this rational sensitivity that prompts 
them to act. In JC theory, no autonomous, distinctive and functionally useful role is at-
tributed to politics. Politics is either collapsed into policy production or treated as an arena 
of parasitic dynamics and exchanges. In the first case, the task of politicians is that of se-
lecting efficient policy solutions through market-driven discovery. In the second case, dem-
ocratic politics is a fluid field in which the formation of common interests is always exposed 
to the risks of rent seeking. The only way through which democratic pluralism can avoid the 
“protectionist dilemma” is by promoting JC embedded in a smart framework of meta-con-
stitutional provisions capable of safeguarding JC and more generally market-conformity. 
III. Democratic competition and the virtues of voice and loyalty 
As mentioned above, modern empirical democratic theories have indeed borrowed a lot 
from models of economic competition. Rather than focusing on citizens/consumers, po-
litical scientists have however focused on the elites. Joseph Schumpeter was the first to 
oppose the citizen-centered with an elite centered doctrine of democratic politics. Ac-
cording the first doctrine (which Schumpeter called the classical doctrine), “the demo-
cratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which 
realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election 
of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will”.21 According to Schum-
peter’s own “other doctrine”, “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”.22 Individuals who compete to ac-
quire the power to decide are, precisely, the elite (or would-be such). The “producers of 
politics” – the expression used by JC theorists to designate incumbent democratic rulers 
– cannot be reduced to policy seekers who try to satisfy in the most efficient way citizen 
preferences; they are also vote-seekers, for the simple reason that electoral support is a 
precondition for accessing policy-making offices. And although some citizens may indeed 
be rational policy demanders ready to vote with their feet, other voters cast their ballots 
based on a variety of non-instrumental motives: emotions, identifications, traditions and 
so on. Voters are not mere passive prey to the competitive struggle of the elites. They 
 
20 V. VANBERG, Globalization, Democracy and Citizen Sovereignty, cit.; V. VANBERG, Competition Among 
Governments, cit. 
21 J. SCHUMPETER, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 250 and 269. 
22 Ibidem, p. 269. 
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organize and mobilize to advance their claims and make themselves heard. In democratic 
politics, voice is more important than exit. And here we come to Hirschman’s model.  
As is known, this model focuses on dynamics of quality deterioration and consumer 
reactions. The model’s basic thrust is that consumers or members of an organization 
have essentially two possible responses when they perceive that the organization’s qual-
ity deteriorates: they can either exit (i.e. withdraw from consumption or the organization 
relationship) or voice (i.e. complain in order to repair or improve the relationship and/or 
making proposal for change). The model includes a third variable: loyalty. If disgruntled 
consumers/members have a high degree of loyalty vis-à-vis the organization, then the 
cost of exit will increase and that of voice will correspondingly decrease. It was Hirschman 
himself to recognize from the beginning that the exit-voice-loyalty triplet could be applied 
not only to the economic but also to the political sphere.23 The first scholar who system-
atically applied Hirschman’s model to macro-politics was the Norwegian political scientist 
Stein Rokkan.24 Even though he did so in a historical perspective with a view to recon-
structing the process of State-formation in Europe since the fall of the Roman empire, 
Rokkan’s theory can be reformulated in more general and abstract terms, thus making it 
more easily comparable with JC theory. 
The starting point of what can be called the Hirschman-Rokkan model (herefrom, HRM) 
is the very constitution of a territorial political community. How does a State become a “ter-
ritorial enterprise” (Betrieb, in Weber’s language), capable of taking collectively binding sov-
ereign decisions? The first step is the construction of a center of authority within a given 
territorial area, commanding adequate resources to rule that area and its inhabitants. The 
key resource consists in coercive resources (remember Weber’s definition of the State as 
the legitimate monopolist of coercive resources). Center-building always implies boundary 
setting. The controlled territory must be demarcated and defended from external intru-
sions. In their turn, subjects (especially those located in the peripheries) must be kept in-
side. Boundaries and closure are the foundational prerequisites for the very constitution of 
a political association claiming sovereignty over a territory.  
The foreclosure of exits and entries prompts a dynamic which Rokkan called internal 
differentiation or “structuring”. If subjects are locked inside, they will direct their attention 
towards the territorial center of authority for protecting/advancing their interests. In line 
with Hirschman’s model, actors who cannot exit will tend to voice in case of dissatisfaction. 
They can do so individually, but soon discover that collective voice is more effective. “Inter-
nal structuring” is the process whereby bounded societies gradually put in place channels 
for interest aggregation and mechanisms that allow political exchanges: support to the au-
thorities (a “who”) in exchange of decisions (the “whats”) which can be binding for all the 
 
23 A.O. HIRSCHMAN, Exit, Voice and the State, in World Politics, 1978, p. 90 et seq. 
24 S. ROKKAN, Entries, Voices, Exits: Towards a Possible Generalization of the Hirschman Model, in Social 
Sciences Information, 1974, p. 39 et seq.; P.FLORA, S. KUHNLE, D. URWIN (eds), State Formation, Nation Building 
and Mass Politics in Europe. The Theory of Stein Rokkan, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
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members of the political association, precisely because all are bounded within it. No one 
can escape its jurisdiction. The democratic method à la Schumpeter is the most effective 
way to reconcile societal pluralism and its incessant, but “structured” voice manifestations 
with a responsive government operating in a context of liberal freedoms. 
Albeit relevant, contingent material interests are not the only driver of a bounded 
society in its relationship with political authorities. The relationship between the external 
bounding and the internal binding of citizens through sovereign decisions is mediated by 
a third element: bonding.25 This is a set of we-feelings that spread throughout the popu-
lation in the wake of continuous mutual interaction, which generates material interde-
pendence and cultural/emotional ligatures. In addition to the organization and stabiliza-
tion of voice channels, bounding generates horizontal and vertical “loyalty”, the third no-
tion of Hirschman’s triplet. Loyalty can be considered as a diffuse support, a disposition 
towards generalized and interest-independent compliance which plays a key role for the 
legitimation of political authority and the transformation of an association into a fully-
fledged political community. 
Figure 1 visualizes the application of the HRM model of “bounded structuring” to the 
long-term process of State formation in Europe. State-building, nation-building, mass de-
mocracy and the welfare State are the four ingredients and at the same time the four 
time phases of that process.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
25 M. FERRERA, The Boundaries of Welfare. European Integration and the new Spatial Politics of Social 
Protection, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
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The consolidation of culturally embedded systems of national citizenship, resting on 
universal civil, political and social rights can be regarded as one of the most significant 
products of Western-style bounded structuring: the anchoring of people’s interaction to 
an institutionalized system of mutual rights and obligations has allowed a quantum leap 
in the stabilization and generalization of social cooperation – the most fundamental task 
to be performed by “politics” as a distinct sphere of action.26 The fusion between territo-
rial control and identity, mass democracy and the welfare State produced very solid and 
highly integrated political communities, functioning according to distinct internal logics. 
Of course, these systems maintained several channels of mutual communication, espe-
cially in the economic sphere (markets typically rest on the availability of exit/entry op-
portunities, especially for goods). But during the golden age of the welfare-democratic 
nation-state, national economies essentially functioned as “black boxes” connected to 
each other by flexible exchange rates.27 Within the black box, the “voice” dynamics of 
social and political pluralism shaped allocative and distributive outcomes.  
Some of the pathologies of democratic politics (summarized in the notion of “rent-
seeking”) denounced by JC theory have not gone unnoticed also on the side of political 
scientists. Social closure has been found to often serve “usurpative” rather than emanci-
patory objectives. The struggle for competition between incumbent and opposition par-
ties has sometimes availed itself of top down clientelistic dispensations or bottom-up 
captures of special benefits. Contemporary rational choice theories have unveiled the 
dynamics which lead to such undesirable outcomes.28 But both the awareness and the 
preoccupation about such dynamics were clearly present already in the early and classi-
cal debates about democracy and the welfare State. Commenting on the up rise of unof-
ficial strikes at the time while he was writing his famous essay on class and citizenship, 
T.H. Marshall lamented that an attempt had been made “to claim the rights of both status 
and contract while repudiating the duties under both these heads”.29 In his turn, R.M. 
Bendix warned that a fundamental civil right and pre-condition of voice, the freedom of 
association or “right to combine”, can be used “to enforce claims to a share of income 
and benefits at the expenses of the unorganized and the consumers”.30 
Well-functioning markets can indeed serve as antidotes vis-à-vis such pathologies. 
And, more generally, the presence of exit options can be a potent generator of positive 
(i.e. virtuous) institutional innovation – as acknowledged by Rokkan himself in an early 
 
26 M. WEBER, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Berkley: University of California 
Press, 1978. 
27 R. GILPIN, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. 
28 S.C. STOKES, T. DUNNING, M. NAZARENO, V. BRUSCO, Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Dis-
tributive Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
29 T.H. MARSHALL, Citizenship and Social Class, in T.H. MARSHALL, T. BOTTOMORE (eds), Citizenship and 
Social Class, London: Pluto Press, 1992, p. 42. 
30 R. BENDIX, Nation-building and Citizenship, New York: Wiley, 1964, p.105. 
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commentary to Hirschman.31 In praising the virtue of exit, one should not forget, how-
ever, the interdependence between external closure and internal structuring. Opening 
increases options and contains “usurpative” exchanges. In this respect, JC theorists are 
definitely right. But opening can also produce de-structuring, i.e. a de-stabilization of po-
litical order and even an erosion of its foundations. This is the aspect neglected by JC 
theories. The introduction of exit and entry options in a previously closed community 
alters the distribution and the value of those internal resources around which social and 
political compromises typically rest. After a threshold, such disruption tends to prompt 
voice reactions: voice against exit (e.g. against company relocations or capital flights); 
voice against entries (e.g. voice against “Polish plumbers” or immigrants). Thus the very 
presence, dynamics and logic of JC gets politicalized (it become an issue of contention 
among opposing interests); it may then become politicized (conflicts become increasingly 
acute, “voice against” gets organized and active); and it may subsequently give rise to 
polityzation: the opponents of JC and opening may arrive at challenging the legitimacy of 
the wider polity, i.e. that association of associations which has made JC possible in the 
first place – and even voicing for outright exit from this association (e.g. the Brexit case).  
IV. Too much opening? The EU’s political predicament 
The EU trajectory offers an emblematic example of the dynamics just described. European 
integration has operated since the 1950s as an “opening” force. Cross-national boundaries 
have been extensively re-defined, differentiated, reduced or altogether cancelled. An inter-
nal market has been established, resting on the free circulation of goods, persons, capitals 
and services. A tightly monitored competition regime forbids national closure practices that 
are judged as market distortions by supranational authorities. A common currency has 
been introduced, underpinned by an “economic constitution” oriented towards stability. 
Firms, capitals and more generally “tax bases” are no longer captive of the nation State, 
they can freely shop around in search of the most attractive jurisdictional rules and services. 
The traditional link between rights and territory has become much looser: for most civic 
and social rights, the filtering role of nationality has been neutralized. Through a long se-
quence of “opening” provisions, the EU has indeed been able to create an imperfect, but 
recognizable level playing field for jurisdictional competition.  
We know however that during the last decade the issues of open boundaries, the 
free movement of persons, workers, and services have given rise to increasing conflicts: 
the EU seems to have fallen prey of disaggregative political and electoral dynamics.32 Na-
tionalist movements have made their appearance all over the continent, voicing for a 
restoration of boundaries and domestic sovereignty. A majority of Britons has voted for 
 
31 S. ROKKAN, Entries, Voices, Exits, cit. 
32 M. FERRERA, The Stein Rokkan Lecture 2016 Mission impossible? Reconciling Economic and Social 
Europe After the Euro Crisis and Brexit, in European Journal of Political Research, 2017, p. 3 et seq. 
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the exit of the UK from the EU – an odd case in which JC has backfired creating a demand 
for jurisdictional re-insulation against “entries”. To a large extent, it can be said that also 
the strictures of EMU’s fiscal rules have backfired, generating in certain countries the be-
lief of an excessive and unwarranted limitation to domestic democratic choices.33 
It is possible that such backfire may have partly resulted from a bad design of the 
EU’s economic constitution, and not from JC dynamics as such. But it seems reasonable 
to search for a more articulated explanation, capable of linking the rise of a novel inte-
gration/demarcation divide to the logic of democratic politics under de-bounding condi-
tions. The HRM provides a theory which is uniquely fit for this purpose.  
Figure 2 visualizes how the model can be applied to European integration in general 
as well as to its more recent developments. Compared to the post-war system of Euro-
pean nation-states, EU building may, in principle, be conceptualized as a novel higher 
order attempt at boundary reconfiguration and internal re-structuring. In this case, how-
ever, supranational center building can only take place at the expenses of national cen-
ters. For the latter, EU building works, as it were, as State-building in reverse: the HRM 
predicts “destructuring”. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
For argumentative purposes, let us break down the process of European integration 
in a three stage temporal sequence. At the beginning (say, the late 1940s) there was an 
ensemble of spatially bounded political units (the various European nation-states), sepa-
rated by thick territorial and regulatory borders. Their political authorities controlled exits 
 
33 Fiscal rules have certainly contributed to domestic political turbulences during the post 2008 crisis 
and, in particular, they have triggered off neo-nationalist mobilizations against “Brussels” and its powers. 
These dynamics have interwoven with the horizontal tensions created by exit and entry movements, but 
are not per se related to JC. 
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and entries. The voice of citizens was channeled through established mechanism of in-
terest articulation and aggregation, such as civic society and economic associations, the 
social partners and parties (internally structured voice). Public policies mainly resulted 
from domestic dynamics of political exchange between “whos” and “whats” (with different 
degrees of efficiency). Each national government could count on long-term legitimation, 
loyalty and durability.  
During phase two (say, 1960s-1990s) boundaries started to be removed. A new, larger 
boundary configuration was established, guarded by supra-unit authorities (the EU). 
Cross-unit exits and entries became free, no longer under the control of national author-
ities. JC could thus take off, and (the possibility of) policy shopping/competition linked 
with free exits/entries created incentives for domestic authorities to adopt more efficient 
policy solutions. The removal of boundaries also impacted on voice, however. Exits and 
entries have altered the distribution and value of politically relevant resources. New lines 
of divisions and conflict potential have arisen (e.g. mobile actors vs. stayers).  
And so we reach phase 3 (2000s onwards): established voice channels started to un-
freeze (get deranged), political patterns got increasingly destructured and political loy-
alty/legitimation gradually unsettled. In the wake of boundary removal and JC, new types 
of voice make their appearance: e.g. voice against exit, voice against entry (right wing 
populism), voice against opening as such (euroscepticism) voice for re-closure (sou-
verainisme) and so on. 
In principle, we might imagine EU building to eventually lead to the formation of a 
much wider bounded association of associations, characterized by its own internal struc-
turing at a higher level. But this scenario cannot be taken for granted. The opposite sce-
nario is equally plausible: separatism (Brexit, Catalonia) or even disintegration.  
The re-visitation (and broad generalization) of Rokkan’s theory in the face of EU-
building has been masterfully provided by Bartolini. His message is clear: institutional 
democratization and the direct connection between the dynamics of supranational inte-
gration and those of national mass politics are deemed to generate an “explosive mixture 
of problems”.34 As is well known, the euro-crisis and the ensuing great recession have 
heavily aggravated the problematic mixture. Building on a Rokkanian background, Hans 
Peter Kriesi and his collaborators have conceptualized and investigated the new conflict 
constellation emerged in the wake of EMU, the Eastern enlargements and the crisis.35 
The EU as such has become a major source of contention, originating a novel “integration-
demarcation” cleavage. 
 
34 S. BARTOLINI, Restructuring Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 409. 
35 H.P. KRIESI, Restructuring of Partisan Politics and the Emergence of a New Cleavage Based on Values, 
in West European Politics, 2010, p. 673 et seq.; H.P. KRIESI, E. GRANDE, M. DOLEZAL, D.M. HELBLING, P.D. 
HÖGLINGER, P.S. HUTTER, P.B. WÜEST, Political Conflict in Western Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012; M. FERRERA, The Stein Rokkan Lecture 2016 Mission impossible?, cit. 
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Integration has implied a transfer of substantial authority from national governments 
to supranational institutions. Developments in this direction have been slow-moving, 
generating incremental cumulative effects. As predicted by JC theory, free movement has 
indeed generated policy shopping on the side of workers, capitals, service providers, 
firms and so on. The suppliers of jurisdictional goods have been induced to rationalize 
their regulatory frameworks. The suppression of exit controls have shifted policymakers’ 
attention towards attracting precious resources from the outside – entry-oriented poli-
cies and measures. The completion of the internal market has indeed brought huge effi-
ciency gains. EMU’s rules have in its turn acted from above to contain fiscally unsustain-
able public finances and to promote market-conforming institutional reforms. However, 
these processes have also started to clash with nation-based welfare democratic prac-
tices and institutions, unleashing dangerous and destructive conflicts. Writing in the 
1970s, Rokkan already warned about these risks. But he also added that nationalization 
of the citizenry inherent in the welfare State would not imply “an increase of feelings of 
xenophobia and distance from others”.36 In certain countries, right wing formations have 
unfortunately fomented xenophobic and even racist orientations and actual behaviors 
which have gone beyond Rokkan’s wildest dreams. The last decade has unearthed the 
structural contradiction (to use Bartolini’s words) between the dynamics of EU building 
and the preservation of the cultural, redistributive and political capacities of national gov-
ernments on the other hand. In such a context, can the new supranational center really 
“hold”? Or are we faced with an unstoppable spiral of system disintegration, in the wake 
of an increasingly loud “voice for exit” (the UK case)? 
V. Conclusion 
This Article has discussed the conception of democratic politics which underpins JC theory 
and has shed light on some dynamics which the latter neglects. My discussion has not chal-
lenged the internal logic of JC theory. It has however highlighted a major limitation: by fo-
cusing only on exit dynamics and their virtues, JC scholars downplay the key role of loyalty 
and of the “voice” side of politics. Governing a political community is always a balancing act 
whose ultimate and absolute mission is to safeguard to stability and durability of political 
order – which is something distinct and autonomous compared to the economic or legal 
orders. The existence of boundaries – and thus a certain degree of foreclosure of cross-
boundary movements – is a necessary condition for political stability and durability.  
European integration provides a telling example of how the virtues of exit find their 
limit in the potential erosion of loyalty and the disruption of voice structures – two pro-
cesses which are deemed to backfire against exit itself and prompt dangerous de-legiti-
mation spirals and anti-opening counter-movements. By removing a number of jurisdic-
tional boundaries, integration has unquestionably increased the options of the various 
 
36 P. FLORA, S. KUHNLE, D. URWIN (eds), State Formation, cit., p. 265. 
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national actors. Individual citizens, service consumers, providers, financial institutions 
and, more generally, social and corporate actors can now choose among a much wider 
repertoire of “locality” options, i.e. choices about where to locate themselves within the 
EU space: staying inside the original or “natural” space of affiliation, exiting from it and 
entering into other spaces, staying out selectively from what they do not like. Moreover, 
actors can pursue such options through a wide range of “vocality” strategies, i.e. strate-
gies that exploit all the possible confrontational opportunities offered by the EU multi-
level institutional system, and especially the new EU legal order, increasingly serving as a 
“law-for-exit-and-voice”, i.e. a set of norms and venues (starting from the Court of Justice 
of the European Union) which actors can use in order to pursue their novel spatial inter-
ests. The wider menu of “locality” options and “vocality” strategies has prompted a new 
spatial politics in Europe, in which the territorial dimension (in its purely geographical, 
but also geo-hierarchical aspects) has become increasingly salient.37 
While not denying that opening and jurisdictional competition have brought about 
some of their expected benefits, my discussion has shown that there are risks involved 
in the process. Too much emphasis on competition may jeopardize the delicate compro-
mises between efficiency and equity, between the market and the solidarity logics which 
have been laboriously achieved through the long historical process of welfare State build-
ing. Especially after the 2004 enlargement, opening has raised increasing fears of social 
dumping and “social tourism”, triggering off undesirable dynamics of xenophobia and 
creating new strains between social groups instead of new ties. Such development has 
also raised delicate issues of legitimacy and democratic accountability – at least insofar 
as the EU’s low “polity-ness” is perceived as a problem by important societal actors, large 
segments of national public opinions and a number of national governments.  
In an early commentary to Hirschman’s model, Samuel Finer aptly observed that exit 
and entries can sometimes turn into “demons” threatening the very basis of political as-
sociation.38 Smart and carefully calibrated boundary-building (and maintenance) is the 
key element for eliciting those “we-feelings” that make citizens loyal to their community 
and its political authorities. Conflict cannot be suppressed, but it can be channeled, civi-
lized and turned into a spur for virtuous institutional change. Under certain conditions, 
voice can operate as the “angel” of politics. As I have underlined, in line with the prediction 
of JC theory, sometimes the angel of voice can by hijacked by petty interests, sectional 
lobbies, and exclusive groups defending their privileges. In such cases, opening and mar-
kets can be robust antidotes to particularistic predations. What matters is keeping an 
appropriate balance between exit and voice, capable of safeguarding adequate levels of 
systemic loyalty. Many commentators have criticized the way in which Hirschman treated 
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loyalty: as a residual category that “fills the equation” when, in the presence of quality 
deterioration, the dynamics of exit or voice do not unfold as expected.39 But loyalty in not 
merely a “tax” on either exit or voice, that lowers their probability. It is the glue that keeps 
the polity together by sustaining its legitimation. As Weber aptly suggested more than a 
century ago, legitimacy is a necessary condition for any exercise of political authority. 
European politics is now confronted precisely with a legitimacy deficit, at the national and 
especially EU level. And our future as Europeans will depend on the capacity of political 
leaders (old and new) to overcome this formidable challenge. 
 
39 B. BARRY, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, review article, in British Journal of Political Science, 1974, p. 79 et seq. 
